by Pramono Fajar
PHENOMENA OF HABIB MUHAMMAD RIZIEQ SHIHAB
IN ISLAMIC LEADERSHIP POLITICS IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

Leadership is an object of study that has long attracted the attention of many people. Leadership science distinguishes between formal and informal leadership. In the context of political Islam, the leadership in Indonesia should be from the head of an Islamic political party, wherein the principle of the party is Islam or at least that particular party is a Muslim-based. However, the political reality has shown different things. The comparison of the vote in the election in 1995 depicted that the Islamic political parties had gathered 45.13% of vote and in the 1999 election the number was 18.6%. Thus, it can be concluded that the acquisition of seats and voter support for the Islamic party parties in the democratic elections in 1999 has greatly decreased namely due to the lost of support by 26.53%. The implication is that in the politics of leadership in Indonesia there are no leaders born from Islamic parties. They are of Muslim status, but their policies and actions are not a reflection of Islamic teachings. In the 2019 Presidential election there is an interesting phenomenon, there is a candidate from the ulama (namely Prof. KH Ma'ruf Amin), but he is not recommended by the Ulama communities and there is another candidate who is not an Ulama, but he is or they are recommended by the Ulamas (Prabowo-Sandi). That is the complexity of the position of Islam in the politics of leadership in Indonesia. This paper will construct the politics of Islamic leadership in Indonesia in a formal and informal perspective and will analyze the causal factors both in terms of the condition of Islamic political parties and based on Islamic ummah and the conditions of Islamic organizations. The results of the study concluded that Muhammadiyah and NU had contributed greatly to the Islamic movements based on the space and conditions in which they lived. Reconstruction of Muhammadiyah and NU has inspired many Islamic movements at that time. History repeats. And there are times when changes must be submitted to those who are more compatible. FPI fills the empty space. Another implication is that there is no strong formal Islamic political figure who can unify the ummah and the nation. The above phenomenon confirms the unclear position of formal Islamic leadership in the political system in Indonesia. The political issue of Islamic leadership is directly proportional to Indonesia's political system which is not pro-Islamic and also not pro-secular which in fact has actually benefited the non-Islamic leadership politics. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration if informal Islamic leaders emerge, such as, Habib Rizieq Shihab (HRS), in response to the collapse of formal islamic leadership politics in Indonesia.

Keywords: Habib Rizieq Shihab, Islamic Leadership and Indonesia

1. Introduction

Leadership is an object of study that has long attracted the attention of many people. The term leadership is often used in connoting a strong and dynamic individual image for people who have succeeded in leading in a field, both military, corporate or leading a country. If we look at the history of Indonesia, for example, we will meet the roles of leaders throughout history. Whether it is their role as people who are considered meritorious, or his role as a person who is blamed in an important event in history(Wirawan 2013).
There are many definitions of leadership expressed by leadership experts. For example, Gardner (2005) defines "leadership is the process of persuasion or example by which an individual (or leadership team) induces a held by the leader objectives group or shared by the leader and his followers" (Avolio, B. J. and Gardner 2005). In this case the gardner makes the process of persuasion and exemplary the key to leadership. While Gary Yukl (2010) suggests the following definitions of leadership "leadership is the process of influencing others to understand and agree on what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individuals and collective effort to accomplish share objectives". Definition reflects the assumption that leadership is a deliberate process from someone to emphasize its strong influence on others (Yukl 2010).

Leadership science distinguishes between formal leadership and informal leadership. Formal leadership is a leadership that leads formal organizations such as companies, government institutions (executive, legislative, judicial), military organizations, and so on. A formal leader is someone who is chosen by a particular organization as a leader, based on official decisions and appointments to hold a position in the organizational structure, with all rights and obligations related to it, to achieve the organization's stated goals.

Formal leaders must basically put their souls and behavior to maintain their leadership image in increasing the trust of the people they lead. The effectiveness and efficiency of a formal leader is to prioritize the interests of the community above his personal and group interests in order to achieve the goals he aspires to. Formal leaders can at all times be avoided or not trusted by the community because the direction of policies and decisions and their work programs always harm the community they lead (Wirawan 2013).

Informal leadership is a leadership that is basically not chosen or formally appointed. A person becomes an informal leader if he is recognized as having physical superiority, psychological excellence, science and skills recognized by members of the organization. Because of having a number of superior qualities, he attained a position as a person capable of influencing the psychological conditions and behavior of a group. In formal organizations, informal leaders do not have the authority to give orders and punish members of the organization. However, he is able to influence organizational members through his visions, giving examples, behavior and practices of making or completing things. The characteristics of informal leaders are: 1) Do not have a formal appointment or legitimacy as a leader. 2) The community appoints itself, and recognizes it as a leader. 3) His leadership status lasted as long as the group concerned still wanted to acknowledge and accept him. 4) Cannot be mutated. 5) Never achieve promotion. 6) Don’t have a boss.

2. Political Conditions of Formal Islamic Leadership in Indonesia
In the context of political Islam, the leadership in Indonesia should be from the head of an Islamic political party, wherein the principle is Islam or at least a party is a Muslim-based. In the 1999 elections, there were at least eight Islamic-based parties, among them those who obtained seats in the DPR at this time were the United Development Party (PPP), the Crescent Star Party (PBB), the Justice Party (PK), the Nahdatul Ummat Party (PNU), Ummat Awakening Party (PKU), the Masyumi Party, the Indonesian Islamic Party (PSII) and others. Besides the Islamic-based party, in Indonesia at present, there are also parties that are based on the Islamic mass, namely among others the National Awakening Party and the National Mandate Party. The last two parties are the supporting masses, mainly from the members and sympathizers of the Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah Islamic Mass Organizations, although not all members of the two organizations are members of both parties (Hamdan Zoelva 2008).

Throughout its history after independence on August 17, 1945, Indonesia has carried out eight time of elections. The Islamic parties have always joined in all of those elections. The first election was held on September 29, 1955 during the reign of the cabinet of Prime Minister
Burhanuddin Harahap (Masyumi), followed by 118 participants from political party organizations, community organizations and individuals to compete for 257 DPR seats and 514 Constituent seats. Of all the electoral participants there were 5 Islamic parties, namely the Indonesian Suro Muslimin Assembly (Masyumi), the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the Indonesian Islamic Party (PSII), the Indonesian Islamic Tharekat Party (PTII), the Tarbiyah Islamiyah Union (PERTI). The results of the 1955 Election, the Islamic parties obtained good results, although they still lost the votes compared to secular nationalist parties. Masyumi and PNI won the DPR elections with 57 seats each, while in the Konstituante an Indonesian state institution with the function of forming a Basic Law or a new constitution to replace the UUD 1950 Constitution.

Masyumi won 112 seats and PNI obtained 119 seats. The next sequence was occupied by NU with 45 DPR seats and 91 seats in the Konstituante, PKI 39 DPR seats and 80 Kontituante seats, PSII obtained 8 DPR seats and 16 Kontituante seats. The total seats obtained by Islamic parties in the House of Representatives are 116 seats out of the 257 DPR seats contested or 45.13%. Whereas in the Constituent Assembly obtained 230 seats from the 514 constituent seats contested in the election or 44.74%.

An interesting note from Deliar Noer is that the failure of Masyumi as the only place for Islamic ummah politics is due to the differences in understanding, attitudes and the views of leaders who have moved before independence, as well as the backgrounds of the elderly in NU and PERTI and the background of many young people in Masyumi, the educational background of the surau and pesantren to the leaders of NU and PERTI, as well as the background of modern education among the people, as well as the role of PSSI leaders during the Dutch colonial period compared to their decree both in Masyumi (1945-1947) and in government, also differences related to the demands of the Minister’s chair between NU and Masyumi related to procedures (Deliar Noer, Universitas Nasional 1987).

The second election was held on July 3, 1971, in the early days of the New Order. The second election was attended by ten political parties including 4 Islamic parties namely PSII obtained 10 seats, NU 58 seats, Parmusi 26 seats and Islamic Party Peri got 2 seats. The total number of seats obtained by Islamic parties is 96 seats out of the 382 seats in the House contested or 26.5%. Since the election of 1977 until 1997, for 20 years there was a rationalization of political parties by the New Order government, namely there were only 3 political parties namely the United Development Party as an Islamic party, Golongan Karya and the Indonesian Democratic Party. The Islamic party has faded with the ever-decreasing vote, namely in the 1977 election won 27.5% of the 380 seats in the DPR, the 1982 General Election, won 26.1% of the 380 DPR seats, the 1987 Election gained 15.25% of the 400 seats contested, the 1992 election won 15% of the 400 seats contested and the last election of the New Order namely the 1997 election gained 16%. Elections throughout the New Order were carried out under the domination of the Golongan Karya which always gained seats above 62% to 75% which was a political instrument of the New Order government. Therefore, the acquisition of an Islamic party at this time is not a real indication of the attitude of voters who are carried out openly and democratically in the election. The New Order utilized all its political forces, namely the Working Group, the Bureaucracy and the Armed Forces to support and maintain its power. Golkar’s victory was fully supported by the strength of the bureaucracy and ABRI.

According to M. Rahmat Effendi this situation is related to the characteristics of the New Order government which is authoritarian in forming a new political format especially in the transition periods of the Old Order to the New Order, the government took a depoliticization step which was carried out systematically through a number of policies including: (1) monoloyalty; (2) floating mass policy; (3) emasculation of political parties (the appointment of Mintareja and Naro for the Chairperson of PARMUSI); and (4) general elections that are not competitive at all. This policy makes Islam a huge target, and provokes the reaction of Muslims (Effendi, M. Rahmat 2003).
The Birth of the Reformation was marked by the fall of the Soeharto government on May 21, 1998, caused by massive mass demonstrations demanding changes in all fields including the fields of political freedom, freedom of the press and the eradication of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism. President B.J. Habibie who replaced Soeharto at that time opened the tap of democracy as broadly as possible by opening and guaranteeing freedom of the press and freeing the establishment of new political parties. This new era was greeted with fanfare with the demands of radical changes in politics. The policy of the President of BJ Habibie, which liberated the founding of the political party, was welcomed by the birth of hundreds of new political parties in Indonesia, namely at least 181 political parties, which continued with the accelerated elections in June 1999. In the first election of the reform period, not all political parties, those who are registered can participate in the election, because after verification by the General Election Commission (KPU) the election is only attended by 48 political parties. This election, is considered the most democratic election that was carried out by the Indonesian people throughout its history after the first election in 1955.

From all political parties participating in the election there are at least 8 Islamic political parties, as described in the initial part of this paper. The results of the 1999 elections showed that the acquisition of Islamic political parties was very small compared to the acquisition of political parties that were not based on Islam. The United Development Party, a one-century-old party, had received 58 DPR seats, namely 12.6% of the 462 seats contested. The Crescent Star Party had 13 seats or 2%, the Justice Party had 7 seats or 1.5%, the Nahdlatul Ummah Party had 5 seats or 1%, and 3 other Islamic parties that have won 1 seat each, namely the Ummat Awakening Party, The Islamic Party and the Masyumi Party, in total 3 seats or 0.64%. Meanwhile, the two parties based on the Islamic mass gained a seat that was also not so large, namely the National Awakening Party (PKB) gained 51 seats or 11% and the National Mandate Party (PAN) gained 34 seats or 7.36%. So that the total acquisition of seats by both parties is 85 seats or 18.36%. This amount is balanced with the acquisition of seats in Islamic parties. Whereas the total acquisition of Islamic party seats and Islamic mass-based parties is 171 seats or 37% (Hamdan Zoelva 2008).

On the other hand, when it comes to practical politics in terms of determining and electing leadership, Islamic parties and parties based on mass Islam can unite and have the same view. This can be seen at the time of President Abdurrahman Wahid's election at the 1999 MPR General Session which was then known as the Central Axis movement. This also appears in the political process and various decision making regarding the determination of public officials by the DPR, almost certainly that these parties can unite and have the same view. This phenomenon shows the presence of a pluralist attitude of Islamic politicians in parliament in politics.

**Table 1: Trend of Islamic Political Parties in Indonesia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>General election</th>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Number of seats in Parliament</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Islam</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>45.13</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular Nationalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>141</td>
<td>54.87</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Islam</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>The New Order</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular Nationalists</td>
<td></td>
<td>Constituent Assembly</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Islam</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>The New Order</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular Nationalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>261</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nationalist Islam</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>The New Order</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>360</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secular Nationalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>265</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Islam</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>The New Order</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secular Nationalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>340</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Islam</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>The New Order</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular Nationalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>336</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Islam</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Reformation Era</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secular Nationalists</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>291</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By seeing the comparison of the vote acquisition of Islamic parties in the 1955 election which was 45.13% with the 1999 election of 18.6%, it can be concluded that the acquisition of seats and voter support for the Islamic party in the democratic elections in 1999 greatly decreased namely losing support by 26, 53%. Similarly, compared to the acquisition of seats in Islamic parties in the 1955 election of 45.13% with a combination of Islamic parties and mass-based Islamic parties in the 1999 election of 37%, also experienced a significant decline of around 8.13%.

Where has the 8.3% of vote gone? It is believed that some of the votes for Islam were included in the Golkar Party, the strong influence of the bureaucracy that gave support to the Golkar Party in the 1999 elections, in addition to many figures from the Masjumi and NU families who entered the Golkar Party because of the political system developed by the Order is extremely strong. This can be seen in the moderate attitude of Golkar party politicians over the demands and views raised by Islamic parties or mass-based Islamic parties.

In this case, Hamsah Hasan tried to see it from the changing concept of the nation-state. Nation-state is a historical reality that cannot be avoided by any nations, including the Indonesian nation. In addition to global demands, the nation-state is a modern state concept that promises solutions for each nation in the face of the realities of pluralism, tolerance and democracy (Hasan, Hamsah 2015). At least this can be seen from the involvement of many HMI activists who joined Golkar, such as Akbar Tanjung.

The implication is that in the politics of leadership in Indonesia there are no leaders born of Islamic parties. Habibie, (1998-1999) whose policies often regarded to bring benefit to the Islamic community was elected as a president after the fall of Soeharto. Habibie is also member of Golkar. Gus Dur (1999-2001) who came to power to later replace Habibie, received victory in the election. Gus Dur was won by the central axis, a combination of Islamic political power and and Golkar factor. Then Gus Dur went down and was replaced by Megawati (PDIP) (2001-2004) to continue the leadership of Gus Dur. Then after that followed by the successive tenure of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) (Democrat) (2004-2014) and currently Joko Widodo (PDIP) (2014-2019). They are of Muslim status, but their policies and actions are not a reflection of Islamic teachings.

In the 2019 Presidential election there is an interesting phenomenon, namely there is a candidate from the ulama (Prof. KH Ma'ruf Amin), but they are not recommended by the ulama communities and there are candidates who are not scholars, but they are recommended by the ulama (Prabowo-Sandi). That is, the complexity of the position of Islam in the politics of leadership in Indonesia. The above phenomenon confirms the unclear position of formal Islamic leadership in the political system in Indonesia. The political issue of Islamic leadership is directly proportional to Indonesia's political system which is not pro-Islamic and also not pro-secular which in fact actually benefits non-Islamic leadership politics. Another implication is that there is no strong formal Islamic political figure as an adhesive to the ummah and nation. So it is not excessive if informal Islamic leaders emerge, such as, Habib Rizieq Shihab (HRS).

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1 Former Chairman of the HMI and then once held the position of Chairman of Golkar who later delivered as Chairman of the Indonesian House of Representatives and was a Minister in the Habibie era.
In the history of Islam, leadership has a very broad meaning, because in principle each of us is a leader as mentioned in the hadith of the Prophet (Tarihoran 2014): Meaning: "every time you are a leader, every leader will be held accountable for his leadership".

There are various things that we can learn from the history of leadership in Islam, including: First, definitions and other terms that are identified in the concept of leadership in our religion are the names of Imam, Guardian, Raa'în, Amir / Umarah, Caliph and so on which shows how leadership is things that can and can be a fairly broad discussion along with the development of human scientific abilities. As mentioned in the hadith of the Prophet above and in the Qur'an, Surat Al Baqarah verse 31, Ali Imran verse 28, Anisa verse 34, 59, Al Isra 71 and so on.

Second, the definition of leadership in Islam is not separated in the dichotomy of religion or the State. The separation of the definition of leadership of the State or society with leadership in religion has caused us to slip on inaccurate understanding, by positioning religion as something that stands alone on one side and the State or society on the other, so that we are presented with perceptions that put religious leadership or more known as spiritual leaders only deal with the moral and the afterlife while the rest are the rights, duties and responsibilities of leaders in the other side. Our Messenger of Allah SAW, Rasululllah, is a leader in the state as well as in religion, as well as the khulafa’ raasyidin. This separation takes place in the history of Islam when it develops and after passing through periods of division among Muslims themselves or along with the development of understanding of leadership science that is less balanced with understanding of the kaafah religion.

The third thing we need to remember together is that the leader in our society’s view today is identical with his position, authority and responsibility. It can be seen from the village (kelurahan) leaders up to the president, members of the city / district DPRD to the Center, the head of the section or subdivision, the head of the unit, or others. In connection with this we need to reflect on the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad: Meaning: For the sake of Allah, I will not appoint an officer who ask for a position asking for it, or for those who have huge ambition with that position (HR Bukhari and Muslim).

Fourth, in the history of Islamic leadership, leadership in the community or group or whatever the name should start from yourself and your family. So that whatever is carried out by the leader, the decisions will get support from the family and the decisions will not be mixed between the interests of the society and the interest of the family. The success of leading a group will be reflected in family leadership and vice versa, this is in line with the beginning of the history of the leadership of the Prophet of Allah, AS, which reminds us of how important it is to pay attention to leadership in the family as HIS words:

Meaning: "... and remember when Abraham was tested by God with a few words of command and prohibition, then Ibrahim performed it. Allah says: “I will make you a priest for all men”, Ibrahim said: "... and I beg of my descendants". (Q.S. Al Baqarah: 24) (Pramono 2018).

3. Political Conditions of Informal Islamic Leadership in Indonesia

The Imam of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) Habib Rizieq Shihab (HRS) has recently become a star. He even became famous in news and some media in Indonesia. Fachry Ali, MA, LIPI Political Communication expert (2018) considers this – the rising of HRS- as a phenomenon.

When Muslims are being alienated -that is the feeling of alienation when they see themselves and their people oppressed by foreign powers- Fachry argue that the mass anxiety is not understood because the views of mass organizations have been very technocratic. This condition have made Habib Rizieq become popular. This indicates that there has been a shift in leadership in the body of Muslims. If major Islamic organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah have become leaders but in the case of actions 411 and 212, there has been a shift.
The National Movement for Fatwa Guards (GNPF) MUI with Habib Rizieq came forward with the aspirations of the people. Even Habib Rizieq Shihab (HRS) was ratified as a high Imam based on the Alumni 212 Congress at Wisma PHI, Cempaka Putih, Central Jakarta held from Thursday-Friday, 30 November - 1 December 2017. During one year in Saudi Arabia, HRS often received visits from some political figures who either accidentally or have planned to meet HRS, including those considered as his political opponents. Not even there, HRS has become a symbol of legitimacy both in the election of governors, regents and mayors in various places (2018) and now the presidential election (presidential election) (2019).

3.1 Strength of Habib Rizieq Shihab
The position of Habib Rizieq in the peak of command and discourse is getting stronger, this is because of a positive image of himself by followers of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). This positive image is connected with faith, knowledge and courage in defending Islam. Consistency is a reflection of his faith. His writings, higher education and the depth of knowledge that he has are the proof of his vast scientific insights. He is not afraid to face challenges and risks even though he had to go to prison are some other proof of his courage.

In the eyes of his followers, Habib Rizieq has all these positive traits and images. After graduating from elementary school in 1975 at SDN 1 Petamburan, Tanah Abang, Central Jakarta, in 1976 Rizieq continued his secondary school to SMP 40 Pejompongan, Central Jakarta. However, because the distance between the school and his house in Petamburan was too far away, he was later transferred to a school that was relatively closer to where he lived, namely Bethel Petamburan Christian Middle School and he graduated in 1979. He then continued his education at SMA Negeri 4 Jakarta in Gambir, but he graduated his high school from Islamic Village School Tangerang in 1982.

Then in 1983 he studied at LIPIA for a year later Habib received a scholarship from OKI to continue his undergraduate studies at King Saud University, majoring in Dirasah Islamiyyah, Faculty of Tarbiyah. In 1990 Habib Rizieq successfully completed his studies and had taught at an SLA in Riyadh for 1 year then returned to Indonesia in 1992. He also continued his Master's program (S2) at Antar Bangsa University, Malaysia but only for 1 year and returned to Indonesia to continue the mission/dakwah. Habib Rizieq briefly took the postgraduate program at the Malaysian International Islamic University for one year, after which he returned to Indonesia before the master's degree was completed due to cost reasons (Jahroni 2004).

After several years, he finally was able to continue his education in the field of Shari’a and won the title of Master of Arts (M.A) in 2008 at the University of Malaya with a thesis entitled "The Effect of Pancasila on the Implementation of Islamic Sharia in Indonesia". In 2012, Habib Rizieq returned to Malaysia and continued his doctoral education program in the Da’wah and Management program at the Faculty of Leadership and Management, Universiti Sains Islam Malaysia (USIM). Currently he is completing his dissertation entitled "مراجع النظرات في إعداد ونشر مرجع "مجلة الأزهر المجلة العلمية (The difference between the Origin and Branch of Ahlussunnah Wal Jama’ah) under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Kamaluddin Nurdin Marjuni and Dr. Ahmed Abdul Malek from Nigeria (Nazaruli 2017).

3.2 Habib Rizieq Shihab and FPI
Habib Rizieq Shihab declared the establishment of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) on August 17, 1998 at the Al-Umm Islamic Boarding School, Tangerang. The Islamic Defenders Front is a mass Islamic organization based in Jakarta (Ma’arif, Syamsul, 2012). In addition to that, there are several internal groups called Sayap Juang, the FPI also has a group of Islamic Defenders Warriors, a paramilitary group that is considered controversial because it is taking action against activities that are considered immoral or contrary to Islamic law, especially during Ramadan (Jahroni 2004).
FPI is an organization that has a structure. The existence of a structure shows that the relationship between one part and another is a hierarchical top-down bond. The top-down relation takes place in a command system, with the top position occupied by Habib Rizieq. Aside from being a command center, Habib Rizieq is also a center of discourse. The ideas and ideas that developed in the body of the FPI came from Habib Rizieq. For FPI followers, the Dialog *Amar Ma’ruf Nahi Munkar* book can be said to be a holy book for FPI followers (Syaefudin, Machfud 2014).

In everyday life Habib Rizieq lives very simply. This can be seen from his small house and is in a small alley, and he is still living in a rent house. The car he uses is still a credit or installment, even though he is very likely to live rich and luxurious from the social network and the position he holds. But all that was rejected by Habib Rizieq and he prefers to live in a modest way. This life choice makes and maintains Habib Rizieq’s social distance with his followers so that he stays in the same socio-cultural class with his supporters. In other words, his choice to stay alive has kept Habib Rizieq to be in the cultural and social roots together with his followers (Agung Nara Indra, Putu 2016).

This positive image has become part of the reproduction tool of its influence. Another fact that makes the positive image of Habib Rizieq among his followers is the close proximity of Habib Rizieq with several political figures, officials, and the military. There was pride in the hearts of his followers when they learned that Habib Rizieq had relations with General Wiranto, Maj. Gen. Jaja Suparman, Inspector General Noegroho Djayusman, and several high-ranking state officials. This pride has strengthened the dignity and influence of Habib Rizieq.

The power relations at FPI are centered on one person or one figure, namely Habib Rizieq. If someone talks about FPI it means that the person is also talking about Habib Rizieq; if someone talks about Habib Rizieq it means that the person is also talking about FPI. The FPI is a transformation from Habib Rizieq, it can be said that Habib Rizieq is FPI. Since the establishment of FPI, the name Habib Rizieq is widely known as the founder, general chairman and high priest. Habib Rizieq's and FPI struggle have often generated polemics. Various pros and cons among the people are always existing. The presence of Habib Rizieq who was very brave ever dragged him to the realm of law. Several times he dealt with the police, did not capitalize Habib Rizieq in preaching (Jahroni 2004).

On October 30, 2008, Habib Rizieq was sentenced to 1.5 years in prison for the riots on June 1 at Monas because it was proven legally to encourage others to openly and with joint force to destroy property or other people in accordance with Article 170 paragraph (1) jo Article 55 of the Criminal Code (Hasbi Widhana, Diegy 2017). He even dared to appear front when there was a case of alleged blasphemy carried out by incumbent Basuki Tjahaja Purnama alias Ahok. He was with Habib, Alim-ulama, Asatidz, and millions of Muslims held a demonstration in front of the Presidential Palace, on November 4, 2016. They demanded justice for the determination of law and detention of Ahok (redaksi Spirit Muslim 2017).

Al Habib Rizieq understands that the various detentions were part of the effort to suppress the propaganda of Habib with the FPI and the “amar ma’ruf nahi munkar” movement. Various reasons were made, layered law articles were prepared and tyranny in the name of the law. However, whatever form of tyranny is committed. Alhamdulillah, - praised to the God- FPI still exists and is consistent with the struggle of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar. Even the number of FPI members is increasing. Various regions from the end of Merauke Aceh to various islands in Indonesia are declared FPI branches. Even in Malaysia the FPI branch has been established. In other countries, such as in Hadhramat Yemen, Cairo, Egypt, there are FPI branches that are members of the FMI (Islamic Student Front), the wing of the FPI.

It is no wonder that Sultanhul Ilmi Al Habib Salim As Syathiri led by Ribat Tariem Hadhramat Yemen once said in his father’s Al-Qutb Haul Al Habib Abdullah ibn Umar As Syathiri, “That the habib, ulama, sailhin and aulia are many on this earth including in Indonesia. However, it is
very rare for a brave person like Habib Rizieq. Maybe it was only 800 years before that when the time of Al Imam Faqih Muqaddam Muhammad bin Ali Ba’alawi "(redaksi Spirit Muslim 2017).

3.3 FPI, ORMAS (MASS ORGANIZATIONS) and Political Parties
It cannot be blamed if there are those who argue that the phenomenon of FPI and Habib Rizieq Shihab has changed the political map of Muslims more than what Islamic political parties should have done. Even large mass organizations like Muhammadiyah, and NU, or Islamic-based political parties such as PKB, PPP, PAN, PKS, the United Nations are just Prosperous. By not intending to be big-headed, FPI inherited the spirit of Pan Islamism movement initiated by the Afghan Shaykh in the first half of the 20th century. FPI has become a political mecca for Indonesian Muslims, symbolically proven by the image of the High Priest Habib Rizieq Syihab even though the head of a political party or presidential candidate. The scholars of 1 and 2 have declared that HRS is the Imam (Yusuf 2018).

The FPI is not as great as the successful Muhammadiyah building thousands of business charities especially compared to NU which has thousands of pesantren and millions of mass scattered in various layers. The FPI only has the spirit of courage to change the status quo, while others are complacent with carrying a modern organization or proud of the status of aswaja caretakers. It turns out that to become an agent of change, it doesn't need many professors or scholars or universities or Islamic boarding schools, but courage changes and FPI does it.

When he first initiated the change, Kyai Dahlan also had nothing. He only had capital courage and smart thinking. The thoughts of Kyai Dahlan were antithetical to the tradition and prevalence of Muslims at that time, Kyai Dahlan took a different path even against the current or condition. Even with Hudatusy Shaykh Hasyim Ash'ary who persevered successfully raised again the scholars who began to wear off. Both organizations that have been reformers have started to decay with age. Stagnant and no longer able to bid fresh thoughts like Kyai Dahlan or Kyai Hasyim at the beginning of their movement. Muhammadiyah is also busy with its business charity which continues to soar but poor new thoughts. While NU only runs in place while continuing to be proud of the majority. In these two organizations there is no longer a generation of fighters. The remaining generation that they have is only the generation of connoisseurs. So do not expect to have the struggling thoughts (Yusuf 2018).

Muhammadiyah and NU have contributed greatly to their time according to the space and conditions in which they live. Reconstruction of Muhammadiyah and NU-style reforms has inspired many Islamic movements at that time. History repeats and is released. And there are times when changes must be submitted to those who are more compatible. FPI fills the empty space. Like its predecessor, Muhammadiyah and NU, the FPI has also been very agile in moving with big renewable thoughts, especially in the aspects of politics, mass mobilization and public opinion. Space that escaped attention. By not intending to deny one of them, but every Islamic movement is always present with its Imam and does not need to be jealous if the Imam of the 21st century Islamic movement according to his followers is taken to the High Priest Habib Rizieq Syihab.

Even though according to the author that is a hasty conclusion because in various events in the elections, such as, DKI (2017), North Sumatra (2018) and Sulawesi (2018) are quite significant, while in some other places less significant, such as in West Java, Central Java and East Java. The bet is the 2019 Presidential Election. It is not as an actor, but as a pressure group.

4. Closing
Based on the above description can be drawn conclusions:
1. That the emergence of informal Islamic leadership in Indonesia is due to being an anti-theosis of the impasse of formal Islamic political leadership, both for Islamic political parties or Muslim-based political parties, including Islamic organizations in Indonesia.
2. The failure of Islamic political parties and political parties based on Islamic ummah both from the parliamentary era to the reformation in giving birth to leadership is due to the more powerful factors of external intervention and the weak mentality of the Islamic political elite in Indonesia.

3. Whereas NU and Muhammadiyah who have been reformers have begun to decay with age. Stagnant and no longer able to bid fresh thoughts like Kyai Dahlan or Kyai Hasyim at the beginning of the movement. Muhammadiyah is also busy with its business charity which continues to soar but poor new thoughts. While NU only runs in place while continuing to be proud of the majority. In these two organizations there is no longer a generation of fighters, who grow and live. The remaining generation is the connoisseurs generation. So do not expect there are struggling thoughts.

4. The FPI which later gave birth to Habib Rizieq Shihab has filled the empty space with all the advantages and disadvantages. Like its predecessor, Muhammadiyah and NU, the FPI has also been very agile in moving with big renewable thoughts, especially in the aspects of politics, mass mobilization and public opinion. It is a pace that is missing from attention.

Based on the conclusions above, there are several things that need to be considered in the future:

1. The need for a comprehensive study of the politics of Islamic leadership in Indonesia, is not only limited when Indonesia is independent, but seen from the history and development of Islam holistically starting from the History and development of the Islamic Kingdom of Demak. Because when Indonesia became independent there were many foreign / external actors who had a strong influence on the political system in Indonesia.

2. Structural movements, such as Islamic political parties and cultural movements, such as Muhammadiyah and NU are designed not to stand alone. In the context of formal legal demands can be understood, but as an Islamic movement that wants to produce formal Islamic political leadership, such as, Erdogan, Raden Patah, King of Islam Demak and so on , it must be done integrally, simultaneously, measured and directed. Because both cultural and structural movements are equally important and must be synergistic to give birth to the politics of Islamic leadership in Indonesia.

3. The FPI and later gave birth to Habib Rizieq Shihab who was not only the High Priest of the FPI, but also the High Priest/Imam of the Islamic Ummah in Indonesia indeed we should appreciate, but with all the advantages and disadvantages. Its position is limited to being the leader of informal Islamic politics and the process of becoming a formal Islamic political leader is still related to the pulling of the electoral system and the party system. Thus, it is necessary to study seriously and comprehensively the format of the electoral system and the party system that is conducive to the birth of formal political leadership of the Islamic ummah. Additionally, it seems that this phenomenon is not only typical of Indonesia, but also occurs in various countries in the Islamic world, including in the Asian Region.
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