The main problem in the gig economy is the imbalance of rights and responsibilities between platform companies and gig workers. This imbalance creates new challenges for gig workers, as they are classified as partners rather than employees. As a result, they lose access to important job protections and social security benefits. This condition causes injustice in gig economy partnerships, which has an impact on the welfare aspect of gig workers. Data from partnership agreements of online driver platform companies such as Gojek, Grab, and Maxim show that companies have full control over the partner's work system without providing adequate welfare guarantees. From the perspective of Sharia economic law, the application of the concept of partnership in the gig economy based on the Compilation of Sharia Economic Law (KHES) can create material and spiritual welfare if it is in accordance with Sharia principles. This study aims to analyze how the partnership relationship, rights, obligations, and limitations of responsibility in the Partnership Agreement of digital platform companies such as Gojek, Grab, and Maxim in the Gig Economy are studied based on the Compilation of Sharia Economic Law (KHES) and the effect of partnership agreements on the welfare of gig workers from an Islamic perspective using the CIBEST welfare model. This study uses a mixed method with a Convergent design. The primary data source comes from the perspective of gig workers. In contrast, secondary data sources are obtained from the partnership agreements of Gojek, Grab, and Maxim platform companies as the most frequently used platforms in Indonesia, the Compilation of Sharia Economic Law (KHES), Islamic Welfare, and the CIBEST welfare model. Data collection methods include literature studies of secondary data sources, observations, interviews with 4 respondents, and questionnaires to 107 online drivers. Data analysis was carried out using a qualitative approach through a study of the partnership agreements of the three digital platforms, observations, and interviews with online drivers, which were analyzed using KHES to understand the aspects of platform partnerships. Meanwhile, a quantitative approach was carried out by measuring the welfare of the CIBEST model to assess the level of welfare of gig workers by considering material and spiritual dimensions. The results of the study show that the partnership agreements of platform companies such as Gojek, Grab, and Maxim are standard clauses that regulate the relationships, rights, obligations, and responsibilities of each party. This partnership relationship is an independent contractor, where the company only provides the application, while the gig worker is fully responsible for their services which results in a significant imbalance in power and welfare for gig workers. According to the Compilation of Sharia Economic Law (KHES), partnership agreements must meet the principles of equality, mutual benefit, good faith, freedom of contract, and careful calculation so that they are in accordance with Islamic welfare with principles such as equality (taswiyah), good faith (shidq), and mutual benefit (maslahah). Gojek and Grab models create economic vulnerability through opaque algorithms and non-negotiable agreements, while Maxim, despite offering slightly better welfare outcomes, still lacks worker protection. With 59.81% of gig workers falling into the category of material poverty, while 7.47% are in absolute poverty, 0.93%, spiritual poverty, and only 31.77% of gig workers are in a state of welfare. This study contributes to filling the gap in studies related to the gig economy with an Islamic welfare perspective. By integrating the CIBEST and KHES models, this study offers a new approach to assessing the welfare of gig workers that is oriented towards material and spiritual aspects.